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Syrian Kurdish politics is complex. While 
the political parties appear rather similar 
in terms of their goals, fierce inter-party 
rivalry exists, nonetheless. Shedding 
some light on Syrian Kurdish politics us-
ing Social Movement Theory as a theo-
retical framework, this article deals with 
how and why Syrian Kurds choose a spe-
cific political party. Interviews with Syrian 
Kurdish political activists in Iraqi Kurdi-
stan provide the data. The interviews 
point out that a striking cleavage exists: 
Respondents sympathizing with the dom-
inant political party preferred social 
equality, while interviewees belonging to 
other parties have a preference for non-
violence. 
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Introduction
During 2014 the Syrian conflict, which be-
gan in 2011, a new stage was reached as 
Syrian Kurdistan came under threat from 
the Islamic State. The Syrian-Kurdish can-
ton of Kobanî became the focal point of 
global media reporting on the fight be-
tween jihadists and Kurdish forces. The 
shared threat presented by the Islamic 
State appears to bring the politically 
fragmented Syrian Kurds closer together 
(Rudaw).
Almost three years into the Syrian civil war 
a de facto autonomous Syrian Kurdish po-
litical entity was established (Hawar news). 
It appears the conflict provided the Kurds 
with the opportunity to create an entity in 
which the dominant party was able to cre-
ate transitional governments in the three 
Kurdish cantons, albeit without elections 
(“Flight of Icarus?” 1).
Rojava—the Kurdish name for the areas 
forming Syrian Kurdistan—became rele-
vant not only within Syria but for the whole 
Middle East as a potential regional politi-
cal actor and the second autonomous 
Kurdish area after the Kurdish Regional 
Government in Iraq (Gunter 1). This article 
focuses on the dynamics between macro 
and micro level occurring within Syrian 
Kurdish politics. From both a scientific and 
a societal perspective, future analysis ben-
efits from better understanding regarding 
the intentions and interests of the new en-
tity. The main research question in this 
study is why do Syrian Kurds choose to 
support specific political parties?
Since Rojava declared autonomy, two ma-
jor blocs have dominated its politics: the 
Kurdish Democratic Union Party (Partiya 
Yekîtiya Demokrat; PYD) and the Kurdish 
National Council (Encûmena Niştimanîya 
Kurdî li Sûriyê, KNC) (Hevian 46; Hokayem 
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78-79). The self-description of both em-
phasizes their struggle for an autonomous 
and democratic Syrian Kurdistan in which 
minority rights are guaranteed (KNC; PYD; 
Sinclair and Kajjo). But neither have yet 
outlined what they mean by these key con-
cepts. (Savelsberg, “The Syrian-Kurdish 
Movements” 102). Their resources differ 
greatly: “Although the KNC is a coalition of 
more than a dozen Kurdish parties, it 
wields no real power in the region. It lacks, 
above all, the military force and other nec-
essary means […] to counter the well-orga-
nized PYD” (Hevian 47). Furthermore, it is 
argued that both blocs are influenced by 
foreign actors. PYD is closely linked to the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistan; PKK), originating in Turkish-
Kurdistan. KNC’s parties have strong con-
nections to different foreign parties like the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (Partiya De-
mokrata Kurdistanê, KDP) and the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (Yekêtiy Niştîmaniy 
Kurdistan, PUK) from Iraqi-Kurdistan. In ad-
dition, some KNC-parties sympathize with 
the PKK as well (Savelsberg, “The Syrian-
Kurdish Movements” 94-96).
Although exact numbers are lacking, it is 
estimated that approximately ten percent 
of Syria’s nearly two million Kurds are 
members of organizations that are labeled 
political parties (Sinclair and Kajjo). How-
ever, these organizations do not exactly 
match the western idea of political par-
ties—associated with electoral processes 
(Allsopp 6). If the party narratives are rath-
er similar, then how and why do people 
choose one specific political party and not 
another one? To answer this question, 
which is essentially about political mobili-
zation, this study will use Social Movement 
Theory to provide an explanatory model. 
Applying Social Movement Theory to po-
litical mobilization among Syrian Kurds is 
not completely new. Jordi Tejel studied 
the Syrian Kurdish 2004 Qamishli revolt 
using an implicit Social Movement Theory 
model, focusing on the macro level. Ac-
cording to Karl-Dieter Opp political mobi-
lization involves a reciprocal process in 
which both the macro and micro level are 
involved. It makes this research—that does 
include the macro-micro dynamics—a nec-
essary complement to Tejel’s to under-
stand political mobilization in Rojava. As 
far as the studies overlap, studying similar 
phenomena in different times and circum-
stances makes a comparative analysis pos-
sible. Other research has applied Social 
Movement Theory in a Middle Eastern set-
ting but not to Syria (Munson; Wiktorowicz), 
nor to the Syrian Kurds (Leenders and 
Heydemann).
Theoretical Framework and Methodology
Social Movement Theory’s different 
schools focus on collective action (Opp 
47-48). Framing Theory assumes individu-
als interpret situations according to an id-
iosyncratic reference, the frame, which in-
fluences their consequential behavior 
(Benford and Snow 614). Collective Iden-
tity Approach assumes that the more an 
individual feels a sense of belonging to a 
group, the greater the chance that the in-
dividual participates in politics on behalf 
of that group (Klandermans 889). Political 
Opportunity Structure assumes “exoge-
nous factors enhance or inhibit prospects 
for mobilization” (Meyer and Minkoff 
1457). Finally, Resource Mobilization The-
ory focuses on social support and assets 
within society that need to be mobilized 
(McCarthy and Zald 1213). These different 
approaches appear to complement or 
overlap one another. They share Mancur 
Olson’s Theory of Collective Action of an 
individual being a rational actor, despite 




Opp combines the schools of Social 
Movement Theory mentioned above into 
a comprehensive model. In it, he consid-
ers these approaches as hypotheses. He 
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assumes that micro-macro-level dynamics 
(between individuals and groups) are es-
sential in understanding political mobiliza-
tion:
The framing perspective deals with 
macro-to-micro relationships (ef-
fects of social movement activities on 
frame alignment) and […] with the re-
lationships of framing and incentives. 
[…] The resource mobilization and 
political opportunity structure per-
spectives focus on the macro model 
and—implicitly—adumbrate macro-
to-micro relationships. The theory of 
collective action is the only one that 
explicitly addresses micro and macro 
relationships, but the theory does 
not mention framing. The identity 
approach is mainly a micro model, 
although there are hints of effects of 
macro structures on identity forma-
tion. The micro-to-macro relationship 
from individual to collective protest 
is not addressed by any perspective. 
(Opp 335, italics in original)
Opp’s is a cyclical model in which macro 
aspects influence the individual, but in 
which the individual’s shared preferences 
also affect the macro level. For this article 
to focus on micro-macro-dynamics, it will 
use Opp’s model to explain why individu-
als (micro level) choose specific parties 
(macro level).
Methodology: Literature Review and 
Semi-Structured Interviews
The study’s contextual base is a literature 
review of Syrian Kurdish politics. Apart 
from Tejel’s, relatively few studies exist 
about politics in Rojava (Allsopp 7; Tejel 1). 
Developments in the Syrian conflict trig-
ger new research and publications on pol-
itics in Rojava. For current affairs (social) 
media are important but unreliable 
sources. In order not to rely completely on 
secondary or tertiary sources, interviews 
were conducted in the region. The litera-
ture review provided the basis for the 
semi-structured interviews. 
Syrian Kurdish History and Present Situa-
tion
While the origin of the Kurdish people can 
be traced back approximately 5,000 years, 
the traditional starting point of modern 
Middle Eastern history appears to begin 
with the First World War (1914-1918) and the 
consequential fall of the Ottoman Empire 
(Fisk; Tejel). Strictly speaking, this is correct 
in the case of the Syrian Kurds, because 
Syria as a modern political entity only came 
into existence as a French mandate region 
after the First World War (Allsopp 20) be-
fore which only Kurds existed. 
In the Ottoman Empire the Kurds experi-
enced autonomy as part of the millet-pol-
icy, providing a high level of self-rule to 
minorities within the Empire with Kurds 
having their own principalities and king-
doms (Black 210). This history, together 
with a culture distinctive from that of the 
neighboring Arab, Persian and Turkish 
people, lead to the inclusion of the Kurds 
in the 1920 Sèvres Treaty, intended to 
achieve peace between the Ottoman Em-
pire and the Allies of World War I. Article 
62 of the treaty promised “local autonomy 
for the predominantly Kurdish areas” and 
Article 64 spoke of “an independent Kurd-
ish state of the Kurds”. The Sèvres Treaty 
was never ratified and the 1923 Lausanne 
Treaty sealed its fate by granting Turkish 
borders. Meanwhile, following the 1916 
Sykes-Picot Agreement Iraq and Syria had 
come under control of Great Britain and 
France, respectively (Khidir 26), dissolving 
the creation of a Kurdish state.
France acknowledged the sectarian diffi-
culties of its inter-war Syrian mandatory 
area and divided it into several autono-
mous regions, although, the Syrian Kurds 
did not receive an autonomous area 
(Dorin), and Syria gained independence 
in 1946. A series of coups d’états occurred 
during the first two decades of indepen-
dent Syria, until Baʿth Party seized power 
in 1963. The Baʿth Party had a secular, 
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strong Arab-nationalist agenda. They 
changed the country’s name from Syrian 
Republic into Syrian Arab Republic when 
they assumed power (Allsopp 22), exclud-
ing people considering themselves non-
Arabs, like the Kurds. They enforced pro-
grams of Arabization upon non-Arabs 
whom the Baʿth considered a threat. Harsh 
repression of Kurds occurred: they erased 
Kurdish references from culture, enforced 
relocations (Tejel 65) and took Syrian na-
tionality from between 120,000 (Tejel 51) 
and 300,000 (Allsopp 148-75; Hokayem 
78) Kurds. The Arabization policy also frus-
trated Kurdish political ambitions to unite 
the different Kurdish areas and create a 
Kurdish state. With this ambition in mind 
the first Syrian Kurdish political party was 
established in 1957. Together with its off-
spring it aimed at political, cultural and 
socio-economic emancipation of the 
Kurds and the democratization of all of 
Syria (Allsopp 28).
Under Baʿth Party rule, Syrian Kurdish po-
litical parties went underground (Allsopp 
31-34). This appears in sharp contrast with 
Baʿth Party’s aid to PKK during the 1980s 
and 1990s: ”[I]ts [Baʿth Party] support was 
not due to its love for in Turkey; but rather 
was the result of its adversarial policies 
with Turkey” (Hevian 46). The PKK-leader 
Abdullah Öcalan lived in the Syrian capi-
tal, Damascus, until 1998. Only when Tur-
key threatened war and to cut off water 
supplies to Syria the regime forced Öcalan 
to leave, which eventually led to his arrest. 
It shows how the Syrian regime used the 
Kurds in its regional power play (Hokayem 
79), bringing Tejel to label the rule under 
Baʿth Party leader Hafez al-Asad (1970-
2000) “the years of exploitation” (Tejel 62).
The death of Hafez al-Asad and succes-
sion by his western educated son Bashar 
in 2000 led to expectations and hope of 
modernization and democratization with-
in Syria. However, disappointment in-
creased among Syria’s population, includ-
ing its Kurds, when these expectations 
were not fulfilled (Hokayem 21-38).The 
combination of disappointment and the 
repressive measures ignited the 2004 Qa-
mishli revolt among Kurds in Rojava. It was 
named after the city where the main pro-
tests occurred. Eventually the uprising 
stopped after Kurdish parties urged for 
cessation of violence. It made the Syrian 
regime aware of the Kurdish capacity for 
collective action. Since then, as there was 
no active civil society among the Kurds, 
the regime allowed Kurdish parties a piv-
otal role between authorities and the 
Kurdish people.
[T]he pacification of the protests led 
by the Kurdish parties themselves was 
a prelude to a new balance between 
the Kurdish movement and the re-
gime. The former has gained a certain 
freedom of action to create space for 
protest where Kurdish ethnicity can be 
openly displayed. The latter seems to 
confirm the selective withdrawal of the 
state. […] Bashar al-As‘ad [sic] seems 
prepared to tolerate the consolidation 
of a Kurdish space (cultural and sym-
bolic), at least for the time being. (Tejel 
136-37)
Nevertheless, dissatisfaction among the 
whole Syrian population remained, espe-
cially when the regime proved incapable 
of coping with a drought that greatly af-
fected Syrian agriculture. In the wake of 
uprisings in other Arab countries small 
scale protests occurred in Damascus in 
February 2011, without any follow-up. Only 
when regime forces cracked down hard 
on protests by schoolchildren in the south-
ern city of Derʿā in March 2011, a process 
of escalation ignited that eventually lead 
to the Syrian Civil War (Hokayem 9-20). 
Syria’s Kurds initially kept a low profile in 
the conflict. Only when regime forces with-
drew from Rojava mid-July 2012 did the 
Kurdish militias fill the power vacuum and 
hence became a prominent actor within 
Syria (Crisis Group “Syria’s Kurds” 2-4).
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Current Syrian Kurdish Politics: The PYD 
and the KNC
Kurdish militias of the People’s Defense 
Corps (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) af-
filiated to the PYD replacing regime forces 
in Rojava raised suspicions of cooperation 
between the PYD and the Syrian regime. 
PYD demonstrations are characteristically 
more pro-PYD than anti-regime.
Rival Kurdish groups argue the YPG be-
longs to Syria’s branch of the PKK—which 
the regime hosted for so long—, sharing 
the same organizational principles and 
Marxist ideology. Further, the YPG-militias 
are trained by the PKK (Crisis Group “Syr-
ia’s Kurds” 11). The YPG provides the PYD 
with the necessary military means to con-
trol Rojava in order to administer political 
power as its best-organized political party 
(Hevian 46-47).
The KNC which formed in October 2011 is 
a coalition of around twelve minor parties.1 
Most of these have their roots in the first 
Syrian Kurdish party, the Kurdish Demo-
cratic Party in Syria (Partîya Dêmokrat a 
Kurd li Sûriye, KDPS) (Allsopp 17). Political 
and personal rivalries make the KNC vul-
nerable to internal struggles, which can 
lead to a lack of effective political power 
(Hevian 47).
The PYD’s image suffers from its link with 
the PKK, designated by both the Europe-
an Union and the United States as a terror-
ist organization. Alliances between the 
KNC and the PYD eventually failed (Tanir, 
Wilgenburg and Hossino 9-10), even 
though they share the same implicit ideal 
of an independent Kurdish entity 
(Hokayem 78-79) and both can benefit 
from cooperation. The KNC has “interna-
tional partners and legitimacy, it is increas-
ingly divided internally and lacks a genu-
ine presence on the ground; conversely, 
the PYD’s strong domestic support is not 
matched by its international standing” 
(Crisis Group “Syria’s Kurds” iii). Violent 
clashes between KNC and PYD support-
ers have been reported (Wilgenburg) and 
the PYD is accused of assassinations, ha-
rassments and kidnappings of KNC mem-
bers (Savelsberg, “The Kurdish Factor”). 
These might reflect a regional rivalry on 
which an organization represents the wid-
er Kurdish community (Crisis Group 
“Syria’s Kurds” 18). Arguably, only after a 
new external threat appeared in the shape 
of the Islamic State, Kurdish parties in Ro-
java agreed to form a new alliance, known 
as the Duhok Agreement (Rudaw). Spring 
2015 the Duhok Agreement seems to have 
failed as well.
Interviews
In the complex Syrian Kurdish politics—as 
sketched above—people decide on which 
political parties to support. How and why 
they choose these parties, as well as which 
specific bloc they support, is an important 
question. The two camps are assumed to 
be quite similar with respect to ethnic 
composition, their overall goals, and the 
level of repression they have experienced. 
Between March 1 and 10, 2014, twelve 
semi-structured interviews were conduct-
ed among politically active Syrian Kurds in 
Iraqi Kurdistan in the cities of Erbil and Su-
laymaniyah and a refugee camp. Contacts 
with political activists were established 
through academic and Syrian Kurdish po-
litical networks. Respondents proved 
helpful in introducing new interviewees, 
often from other parties, and sometimes 
even from rival parties.
Interviewees’ Backgrounds
The interviews were conducted with peo-
ple from seven different parties, as well as 
two independent activists (both, however, 
with clear sympathies). Eight interviewees 
including the two independent activists, 
are active on a national (that is Rojava) lev-
el, three on a regional level, and one on 
village level. In total ten men and two 
women were interviewed, of whom nine 
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were middle aged and three were in their 
twenties and thirties. Of the seven people 
talking about their origins, two originate 
from peasant families, four from a village 
and one from a major city. Three villagers 
and one of peasant background moved to 
a big city during childhood, usually as a 
consequence of regime policy. Four re-
spondents originate from contested areas 
within the Syrian Conflict, such as Damas-
cus or the Afrin region in northwest Syria. 
Of the eight respondents who mentioned 
their education, one had finished elemen-
tary school and six completed secondary 
school. One respondent has a doctor’s de-
gree.
Interviewee Motivation: Why Become Po-
litically Active?
Education proved to be one of the fields 
where interviewees experienced repres-
sion by the Syrian regime: not being al-
lowed to attend university, being forced to 
study Arabic literature, or not being al-
lowed to discuss Kurdistan or Kurdish 
identity. On the other side of the spec-
trum, one interviewee became politically 
active following the receipt of a grant from 
his father’s Kurdish political party. Six peo-
ple became politically active during their 
secondary schooling. Other factors that 
made people politically active include the 
regime’s agricultural policies (that discrim-
inated against Kurdish farmers), the fight 
for women’s rights and the emergence 
among individuals of a feeling of Kurdish 
nationalism. 
The interviewees all share awareness of 
the regime’s repressive measures towards 
the Syrian Kurdish population and indicat-
ed that this was a key element in becom-
ing politically active. For both female re-
spondents women’s emancipation was an 
additional aspect. In a broader context, 
four interviewees emphasize their activism 
is for Kurdish rights in particular, but for 
Syrian rights in general as they recognize 
the Syrian regime discriminates other eth-
nic groups as well.
The political ideas of Mustafa Barzani are 
also important for the KNC affiliated activ-
ists and Abdullah Öcalan for the PYD and 
their affiliates. These names were men-
tioned nine times in total, but respondents 
also mentioned other political thinkers. 
Among the PYD, left wing writers are pop-
ular, such as Marx, Lenin, Gorki and 
Chekhov, while Nietzsche and Rousseau 
were also named. A number of interview-
ees—both PYD—named the Kurdish nation-
alist poet Cigerxwin among others as a 
main source of inspiration.
Poems and other cultural expressions play 
an important role in the lives of many of 
those interviewed. One KNC activist 
summed up his feelings by reciting a self-
written poem. Singing and dancing and 
the Kurdish New Year celebration of 
Nowruz are also important points of refer-
ence. Finally, Marxist revolutions inspired 
solely the PYD supporters have been im-
portant. They see Angola, Cuba and Viet-
nam as examples of peoples who freed 
themselves from oppression as they con-
sider the Arabs the oppressors in Rojava. 
One independent respondent also used 
these revolutions as an example, howev-
er, he did so in order to emphasize that 
violent revolutions eventually lead to less 
than good outcomes. 
The Interviewees and Leverage: Becom-
ing Politically Active
How, then, do people become politically 
active? Six respondents answered that 
family members were politically involved; 
five in the same party as their family mem-
bers, one was independent. Three inter-
viewees became acquainted with political 
ideas through the media, especially radio 
broadcasts. Here education also played an 
important role because it created aware-
ness among the respondents regarding 
the regime’s repression. Some undertook 
further research independently and then 
volunteered for political action, as one of 
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the female activists tells about her joining 
the armed rebellion:
In 1996 comrade Zilan committed a sui-
cide attack in Turkey. I named my name 
after her. At that age, the comrades re-
fused to accept me in the armed revo-
lution. I was allowed to do only political 
activism […]. [W]hen Öcalan was ar-
rested, my sympathy grew so strong—
due to my own research and since I 
knew about the Kurdish situation in the 
Middle East—, that I insisted on joining.2
In one case the peshmerga, the Kurdish 
fighting force, triggered political activism 
by passing through villages and recount-
ing their stories.
The Interviewees and Choice: Why Be-
come Member of a Specific Party? 
As most of the respondents were of mid-
dle age, most answered that the choice 
was limited when they became politically 
active. One interviewee said the he re-
mains loyal to his party. Four PYD mem-
bers emphasized the focus on the whole 
of society—in case of the female activists 
including women’s rights. Five non-PYD 
respondents claim the choice of their par-
ty depended on its non-violent nature. 
When asked about the use of violence for 
political ends PYD members commented 
they are willing to use it in the case of self-
defense. In four cases, choice was a matter 
of lacking other alternatives, either be-
cause only one party was active in the vil-
lage of origin, or that other parties were 
deemed to be worse. Five people joined 
the parties in which relatives were already 
active. Figure 1 summarizes these respons-
es.
Overall Findings
Although twelve respondents is a small 
number, the observations are interesting 
and point the way to further research. Re-
spondents referred to either Mustafa 
Barzani or Abdullah Öcalan on nine out of 
twelve occasions as an inspiration in be-
coming politically active. It appears, there-
fore, that these leaders and their thinking 
have exerted great influence on Kurdish 
political life, even though Barzani is dead—
his son Massoud has succeeded him—and 
Öcalan is imprisoned in Turkey. An inter-
esting development, then, is the ostensi-
ble approach by Öcalan towards Barzani, 
claiming the latter to be the leader of all 
Kurds (Kurdpress).Another important fac-
tor is family, which appears to be of great 
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answers for why supporting a political party. 
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influence in the way in which someone be-
comes politically active and with which 
party they ultimately become involved. 
Furthermore, one of the primary reasons 
given for why people join a specific party 
is the preference—emphasized by PYD 
members—for a party to be based upon 
social equality and accepting violence 
only on the basis of self-defense—all of 
which are reminiscent of Rousseau (Rus-
sell 695). It is also revealing that Rousseau 
is mentioned directly by one of the re-
spondents as having influenced his politi-
cal thought. KNC-members emphasize 
they choose non-violent politics, and while 
other factors appear to be evenly distrib-
uted between both sides, the preference 
for social equality versus non-violence 
seems to be mutually exclusive among the 
respondents. The related observation that 
only PYD-members regard Marxist revolu-
tions abroad as positive examples seems 
to confirm this cleavage within Syrian 
Kurdish politics.
Structural-Cognitive Model and Syria’s 
Kurds
Incorporating the results into the Structur-
al-Cognitive Model leads to somewhat 
ambivalent outcomes, especially in rela-
tion to the impact of relatives on political 
participation. Research suggests that 
members of the same group—family—
share common experiences leading to 
similar political preferences (Barner-Barry 
and Rosenwein 94). Family as phenome-
non in Social Movement Theory can be 
situated among all main sub-theories of 
the Structural-Cognitive Model. How to lo-
cate family within the model needs further 
exploration.
From a Framing Theory perspective the 
choice for either the KNC or the PYD is a 
dynamic process in which the macro level 
influences the individual. This explains the 
importance of family members as the cul-
tural expressions emphasizing Kurdish 
identity and focusing on collective repres-
sion. In case of the PYD, this feeling is en-
forced by class awareness (itself influ-
enced by left wing literature), creating an 
image of the colonized people whom 
must free themselves from repression. An-
other aspect is that each respondent 
seems to present their answers in corre-
spondence with the framing of the respec-
tive parties when it comes to the accep-
tance of violence. 
Cultural expressions—and, for the female 
respondents, their gender—that empha-
size the group’s uniqueness and offer the 
individual a feeling of belonging can pro-
voke political activism, an argument which 
is supported by Collective Identity Ap-
proach. Perhaps the issue of family might 
fit here as well.
In all twelve interviews the respondents 
mention repression of Kurds as a key fac-
tor in becoming politically active. Some 
scholars use Political Opportunity Struc-
ture as an explanatory model for the Kurds 
political activism during the Syrian Con-
flict: “The weakening of a state that proved 
oppressive, manipulative, and oblivious to 
their needs presented new political op-
tions for them” (Hokayem 78). As obvious 
as this might seem, it does not explain the 
macro level reluctance of the Kurds to join 
the opposition in initial years of the Syrian 
Conflict. Following Tejel, the coming to 
power of Bashar al-Asad and his tolerance 
of some form of Kurdish entity after the 
Qamishli-revolt explains why the Kurds are 
reluctant to give up this position. Only af-
ter the regime withdrew from Rojava did 
they participate in the conflict. This implies 
that the political opportunity is not primar-
ily the Syrian Conflict, but al-Asad’s chang-
ing attitude towards the Kurds.
Resources cohere with opportunities and 
both are recognized within a specific 
frame of reference. Hence, Resource Mo-
bilization Theory interprets the framing el-
ements as necessary instrumental assets 
for creating popular support. Political op-
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portunities are only considered as such if 
there are enough assets to actually regard 
them as a viable option. In their reciprocal 
relationship, Resource Mobilization Theo-
ry and Political Opportunity Structure 
identify the same important factors, such 
attractive leadership and organization, 
both of which were mentioned by KNC 
and PYD supporters.
Further research is necessary to gain 
greater insight into the processes of po-
litical mobilization among Syria’s Kurds. In 
addition to having experienced repres-
sion, leadership inspired respondents to 
become politically active. Half of the re-
spondents became involved through rela-
tives, while others were influenced by the 
media. Why they choose their specific par-
ty is mainly due to individual perceptions 
regarding the weaknesses of other par-
ties, although in some cases there were 
simply no alternatives. Both sides dis-
played fairly similar opinions on these is-
sues. The major difference which emerged 
concerns other reasons that underpinned 
the choice of party: KNC respondents 
were clearly motivated by the narrative of 
non-violence, while PYD respondents 
chose social equality while accepting vio-
lence in cases of self-defense.
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